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GIVING STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT THE BENEFIT OF THE 
DOUBT:  HOW TO ENSURE VCCR 
COMPLIANCE WITHOUT JUDICIAL 
REMEDIES 
Victoria M. Lee* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (―VCCR‖), the United States agreed to notify the 
consulate of a foreign national of any arrest or detainment should 
he so request, and furthermore, to inform all arrested and detained 
foreign nationals of their ―right‖ to consular notification.1 Article 
                                                        
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; B.A., Gettysburg College, 2005. 
Thanks to: the Journal of Law and Policy members for their hard work; my 
family, not only for their continued support, but also for their understanding in 
dealing with my busy schedule; and my friends for reminding me to take a break 
now and again. 
1 1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions 
relating to nationals of the sending State: 
. . .  
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State 
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, 
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or 
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any 
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by 
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be 
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities 
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this 
sub-paragraph. 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(b), Dec. 14, 1969, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR]. 
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36 of the VCCR—the communications provision—has recently 
been the center of both national and international controversy.
2
 The 
debate has largely centered on three issues: whether this section 
confers any individually enforceable rights, how it should be 
implemented, and how it should be enforced.
3
 United States courts 
have come to little consensus on any of these questions.
4
 The 
Supreme Court started the debate on individually enforceable 
rights with a passing comment in Breard v. Greene that the VCCR 
―arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance 
following arrest.‖5 The Court, however, has yet to confirm or deny 
the existence of privately enforceable rights under Article 36.
6
 
The United States Courts of Appeals and state courts have 
largely ignored the question in the criminal context by assuming 
that even if the VCCR conferred individual rights, whatever 
remedy sought was an inappropriate measure given the violation.
7
 
Having been effectively barred in many instances from challenging 
a violation of Article 36 with respect to their criminal convictions, 
an increasing number of convicted foreign nationals are pursuing 
civil remedies for a violation of their rights under the laws of the 
United States.
8
 The circuit courts have been more willing to 
confront the question of individually enforceable rights head-on, 
                                                        
 2 See generally Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 
2007); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31). 
3 See, e.g., Cornejo, 504 F.3d 853; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466; Avena, 2004 
I.C.J. 12. 
 4 See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing the split 
of the Courts of Appeals). 
5 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). 
6 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas 
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006). 
7 E.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (―[I]rrespective 
of whether or not the treaties create individual rights to consular notification, the 
appropriate remedies do not include suppression of evidence or dismissal of the 
indictment.‖); Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003) (same); State v. 
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45 (Iowa 2003) (same). 
8 See, e.g., Mora, 524 F.3d at 192 (considering an Article 36 violation 
under the VCCR itself as well as under the Alien Tort Statute and § 1983).  
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however, with mixed results.
9
 The majority of courts have found 
that Article 36 does not confer any judicially enforceable rights on 
private parties.
10
 Techniques of traditional treaty interpretation also 
support the idea that the VCCR does not confer individual rights.
11
 
Yet, legal scholars protest such a conclusion—primarily on the 
basis of ensuring international reciprocity and reputation.
12
 The 
courts should not, however, find individual rights—where they do 
not exist—simply to appease the international community.13 
Most scholars who argue in favor of individual rights assume 
that some judicial remedy will then be appropriate to address the 
violation of Article 36.
14
 However, no existing judicial remedy can 
                                                        
 9 Compare Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that Article 36 does not confer ―enforceable individual rights‖), with Jogi v. 
Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that Article 36 does confer 
individual rights on foreign nationals). 
10 E.g., Gandara, 528 F.3d at 829; Mora, 524 F.3d at 186–87; Cornejo v. 
County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007).  
11 Steven G. Stransky, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: A Missed Opportunity 
in Treaty Interpretation, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 25, 67 (2007) (―The VCCR‘s 
text, the Executive Branch‘s interpretation, the travaux preparatoires, the 
VCCR‘s ratification process, and other states‘ domestic implementation all 
exemplify the fact that foreign nationals cannot use Article 36 as an avenue for 
judicial relief in American courts.‖). 
 12 See, e.g., Michael J. Larson, Calling All Consuls: U.S. Supreme Court 
Divergence from the International Court of Justice and the Shortcomings of 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 317, 331 (2008) (―[I]n a 
world with increasing numbers of Americans abroad, it would be beneficial for 
U.S. citizens arrested in foreign countries for the Supreme Court to set a 
standard of granting judicially enforceable individual rights under the 
[VCCR].‖); Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to 
Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (2003). 
 13 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (―A treaty is . . . 
‗primarily a compact between independent nations‘ . . . . It ordinarily ‗depends 
for the enforcement of its provision on the interest and the honor of the 
governments which are parties to it . . . . It is obvious that with all this the 
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.‘‖) (quoting Head 
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (internal citations omitted)).  
14 See, e.g., Larson, supra note 12, at 343 (arguing that Article 36 violations 
are on par with constitutional violations and as such, ―similar remedies, such as 
the suppression of evidence and the granting of a new trial, ought to be 
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cure a VCCR violation.
15
 The United States Supreme Court and 
most state supreme courts have correctly ruled against suppression 
of evidence as an appropriate remedy.
16
 Civil remedies for a 
violation of rights under federal law also fail to redress violations 
of the VCCR.
17
 First, courts that have confronted this question 
have found that neither the VCCR itself, nor the Alien Tort Statute, 
can justify a remedy.
18
 Second, claims under section 1983 (or 
similarly drawn state statutes) fail by reason of qualified immunity 
for state actors or as collateral attacks on the foreign nationals‘ 
criminal convictions.
19
 Therefore, no judicial remedy adequately 
addresses VCCR violations.  
While some scholars argue that a judicial remedy is the only 
way to ensure domestic compliance with Article 36,
20
 this is 
                                                        
implemented depending on the degree of the treaty violation‖); Marshall J. Ray, 
The Right to Consul and the Right to Counsel: A Critical Re-examining of State 
v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 37 N.M. L. REV. 701, 728–30 (2008) (arguing in favor 
of suppression of evidence or jury instructions as appropriate remedies for 
VCCR violation). 
 15 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
16 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349 (2006); see also, e.g., 
People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 31, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (refusing to apply 
the exclusionary rule to VCCR violations); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 
38, 45 (Iowa 2003) (―[T]he exclusionary rule simply does not apply to evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 36.‖). 
 17 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
18 E.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no 
available civil remedy under the VCCR itself because the treaty makes no 
mention of such a remedy, and no available remedy under the Alien Tort Statute 
because there is no cognizable tort of VCCR violation). 
19 See discussion infra Part II.B.2. The courts that have dealt with section 
1983 claims have not yet reached the question of actual remedy because most 
courts have not found individually enforceable rights; therefore, there has been 
no decision about the applicability of qualified immunity in VCCR violation 
cases. However, the Seventh Circuit in Jogi v. Voges—which found enforceable 
rights—noted that ―the issue of qualified immunity . . . will [inevitably] arise.‖ 
480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2007). 
20 E.g., Joshua E. Carpenter, Medellin v. Dretke and the United States’ 
Myopic Failure to Guarantee the “Full Effect” of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 515, 517 (2007) (―[A] 
Supreme Court precedent clarifying [individually enforceable rights] is the only 
way to ensure the United States‘ adherence to VCCR Article 36(2).‖). 
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simply not the case and courts should not impose improper and 
inadequate remedies based on this assumption. This Note argues 
that the VCCR confers no individually enforceable right on foreign 
nationals and that even assuming arguendo that some enforceable 
right does exist, available judicial remedies are either improper or 
inadequate avenues to addressing VCCR violations.
21
 Instead, 
enforcement of the VCCR is better served through alternative 
means. Part I of this Note discusses the background of the VCCR. 
Part II first addresses the debate on the existence of individual 
rights in Article 36, ultimately concluding that no such right exists. 
Part II goes on to argue that in either case, no judicial remedy will 
satisfactorily address violations of the VCCR. Part III analyzes the 
current policies in place for VCCR compliance and possible 
methods of increasing compliance in individual states without 
judicial remedies. In conclusion, Part III offers a suggestion for 
how to ensure the United States‘ compliance with Article 36 
without relying on judicial remedies. 
I. VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 
A.  Brief History and Basic Structure 
The VCCR is a multilateral treaty that was designed to unify 
(and subsequently codify) the practices of consular relations, 
which prior to the United Nations Conference varied greatly with 
―bilateral agreements and national laws‖ governing.22 
Representatives from more than eighty-five countries gathered on 
March 4, 1963, to begin negotiations of an international treaty to 
regulate all manner of consular relations.
23
 The Conference started 
with a draft developed over eight years by the International Law 
Commission.
24
 After several weeks of tedious discussion and 
negotiation, the Conference ended with a seventy-nine-article 
treaty and two Optional Protocols—one of which concerned the 
                                                        
 21 See discussion infra Part II. 
22 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 1st plen. 
mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR1 (Mar. 4, 1963). 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 Id. at 7. 
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resolution of disputes under the VCCR.
25
 
With the purpose of ―maintain[ing] international peace and 
security, and [promoting] friendly relations among nations,‖26 the 
United States and its fellow delegations unanimously adopted the 
VCCR at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference in April 
1963.
27
 Since that time, the total number of member states has 
increased to over 170 countries.
28
 Provisions of the VCCR address 
the spectrum of consular relations including ―consular functions; 
facilities, privileges and immunities of consular personnel; and 
communications with nationals of the sending state.‖29 Several 
                                                        
25 The Optional Protocol—initially signed by the United States and thirty-
seven other member states—confers jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the 
VCCR on the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖). U.N. Conference on 
Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. II, Optional protocol concerning the 
compulsory settlement of disputes at 190–92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/15 (Apr. 
24, 1963). As of March 7, 2005, the United States is no longer a party to the 
Optional Protocol, nor bound by decisions of the ICJ. United Nations Treaty 
Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 
at n.1 (2008), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx 
(follow ―Chapter III‖ hyperlink; then follow ―8. Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of 
Disputes‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). The withdrawal was made in 
response to an unfavorable decision in the Avena case, discussed infra notes 82–
83 and accompanying text, to ―[protect] against future International Court of 
Justice judgments that might similarly interfere in ways [the U.S.] did not 
anticipate when [it] joined the optional protocol.‖ Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has 
Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16 
(quoting Darla Jordan, State Department spokeswoman).  
26 VCCR, supra note 1, preamble. 
27 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 22d 
plen. mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.1 (Apr. 22, 1963). Some delegations 
approved the final act with reservations, id. at 42–54, with several countries 
expressing reservations specifically with Article 36. Id. at 42, 45, 47–48, 51–52. 
28 United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 25 (follow ―Chapter III‖ 
hyperlink; then follow ―6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations‖ 
hyperlink).  
29 Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the 
VCCR is divided into five chapters: 1) Consular Relations in General, 2) 
Facilities, Privileges and Immunities Relating to Consular Posts, Career 
Consular Officers and other Members of a Consular Post, 3) Regime Relating to 
Honorary Consular Officers and Consular Posts Headed by Such Officers, 4) 
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delegates expressed the sentiment that of all these provisions, 
―Article 36 was one of the most important in the whole draft.‖30 
B.  The Communications Provision 
Article 36—the communications provision—deals in part with 
notification of local consulates when a foreign national is arrested 
or detained.
31
 With the presumption that consulates should be 
given access to arrested or detained nationals, the provision asserts: 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular 
functions relating to nationals of the sending State: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with 
nationals of the sending State and to have access to 
them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the 
same freedom with respect to communication with and 
access to consular officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the 
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular 
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, 
a national of that State is arrested or committed to 
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any 
other manner. Any communication addressed to the 
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody 
or detention shall also be forwarded by the said 
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall 
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights 
under this sub-paragraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a 
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody 
                                                        
General Provisions, and 5) Final Provisions. VCCR, supra note 1. 
30 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d 
Comm., 17th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963) 
(comments by a French delegate); see also id. at 17 (comments by a Tunisian 
delegate) (stating that ―[Article 36] paragraph 1(b) was one of the most 
important in the draft‖); id. at 13 (comments by a Greek delegate) (expressing 
the ―very great importance‖ attached to Article 36 given its potential impact on 
the future of human rights). 
 31 See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36. 
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or detention, to converse and correspond with him and 
to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also 
have the right to visit any national of the sending State 
who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in 
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular 
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a 
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he 
expressly opposes such action. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of 
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the 
said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given 
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this 
Article are intended.
32
 
The International Law Committee, which originally proposed 
Article 36, designed this provision to cover any situation where a 
foreign national may be detained—including pre- and post- 
criminal conviction, ―quarantine, [and] detention in a mental 
institution.‖33 As originally drafted, paragraphs 1 and 2 focused 
solely on consular officials; there was no mention of the detained 
foreign national.
34
 It is clear from discussions at the Conference, 
however, that the Article was meant to facilitate the ability of 
consular officials to protect their citizens traveling abroad.
35
 The 
final draft reflected a compromise between an attempt to make 
compliance feasible for receiving states and to maintain the rights 
of the sending state in protecting its citizens abroad.
36
 
                                                        
32 Id. 
33 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. II, 
Annexes—Draft articles on consular relations adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its thirteenth session at art. 36 commentary (4)(c), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.25/6 (1963). 
34 Id. at 24. 
35 See generally U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, 
Vol. I, 2d Comm., 17th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963) 
(discussion of proposed amendments to paragraph 1(b)). 
36 See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 11th 
plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.11 (Apr. 17, 1963) (comments by 
the Vietnamese delegate) (―[I]t was a matter of reconciling the interests of two 
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While Article 36 primarily addresses the receiving states‘ 
obligations to consular officials, section (1)(b) directs that the 
authorities of the receiving state ―shall inform the person 
concerned without delay of his rights . . . .‖37 The meaning of this 
phrase is the source of debate, not only in U.S. courts but for other 
nations and the ICJ as well.
38
 Ever since the Court‘s passing 
comment in Breard v. Greene concerning the possibility of 
individual rights under Article 36,
39
 a flurry of criminal and civil 
challenges have been brought by foreign nationals in U.S. courts,
40
 
forcing lower courts to grapple with questions about the 
communications provision that the Supreme Court refuses to 
answer.
41
 Unless the Supreme Court rules definitively that no 
individual rights exist under the VCCR, the flurry of litigation 
threatens to continue or possibly become a flood of litigation. In 
the meantime, legal scholars and lower courts will continue to 
debate what rights, if any, foreign nationals have, what actions are 
appropriate to remedy violations of those rights, and how to 
enforce compliance in the United States with the communications 
provision. 
                                                        
equal sovereign States — the sending State and the receiving State — with 
respect for the rights of the detained person.‖). 
37 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b). 
38 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 15, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3598178 
(citing art. 36(1)(b) in arguing that the plain text of the VCCR confers an 
individually enforceable right); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 492–
93 (June 27) (citing Germany‘s argument that the German defendants had 
individual rights under Article 36 given the reference to ―rights‖ in the last 
sentence of paragraph 1(b) ―of the person concerned‖). 
39 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). 
40 See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001); Rahmani v. State, 898 
So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Salgado, 852 N.E.2d 266, 
276–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Gomez v. Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 238, 242 
(Ky. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Oritz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005). 
41 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (assuming, 
without deciding, that Article 36 conferred an individual right). 
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II.THE GREAT VCCR DEBATE 
A.  Right or No Right? 
Although the Supreme Court has refused to explicitly accept or 
reject the existence of individual rights under Article 36 of the 
VCCR, other entities have not been so reluctant to address the 
issue.
42
 Lower courts, the Executive Branch, the ICJ and legal 
scholars have all taken definitive positions one way or the other 
employing a variety of approaches.
43
 
 1.  Approach by Domestic Courts 
Although the analysis employed by each court differs in some 
respect, the majority of domestic courts have ruled against the 
establishment of privately enforceable rights in Article 36.
44
 In 
determining whether the VCCR conferred individual rights on 
foreign nationals, courts have examined both the text of and 
context around the VCCR.
45
 As noted by the Ninth Circuit 
majority in Cornejo v. City of San Diego, ―Article 36 textually uses 
the word ‗rights‘ in reference to a detainee‘s being informed that 
he can . . . have his consular post advised of his detention and have 
                                                        
 42 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting sister 
circuits that have addressed and answered the question of individual rights under 
the VCCR). 
 43 E.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 831 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no 
individual right to sue under the VCCR); see United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 
63–64 (1st Cir. 2000) (―The [VCCR] . . . establish[es] state-to-state rights and 
obligations . . . . [It does] not . . . establish[] the rights of individuals. The right 
of an individual to communicate with his consular official is derivative of the 
sending state‘s right to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular 
relations exist . . . .‖ (quoting the State Department‘s ―Answers to the Questions 
Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li‖)); LaGrand, 2001 
I.C.J. at 494 (holding that the VCCR does confer individual rights on foreign 
nationals); Stransky, supra note 11, at 67–68 (arguing that no individual rights 
exist in the VCCR). 
44 E.g., Gandara, 528 F.3d at 831; Mora, 524 F.3d at 192; Cornejo v. 
County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007). 
45 Mora, 524 F.3d at 193–94. 
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communications forwarded to it.‖46 On its face, then, the VCCR 
seems to confer individual rights.
47
 However, when interpreted in 
the context of the introductory language of Article 36 and the 
preamble of the VCCR, this textual reference is less clear.
48
 The 
introductory language of Article 36(1) stipulates that it is related 
specifically to ―facilitating the exercise of consular functions.‖49 
The preamble reinforces this goal, stating that ―the purpose of such 
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure 
the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf 
of their respective States.‖50 The majority of courts have found 
these provisions to militate against inferring individual rights under 
Article 36.
51
 However, in Jogi v. Voges, the Seventh Circuit found 
the language of Article 36 so clear that it was unnecessary to use 
the preamble to interpret its meaning.
52
 Article 36 specifically 
provides that authorities must ―inform the [foreign national] 
concerned without delay of his rights.‖53 In light of this language, 
Seventh Circuit Judge Wood accused the other circuits of 
―creat[ing] ambiguity . . . where none exist[ed].‖54  
The disagreement over ambiguity, however, stems less from 
the plain language of Article 36, but primarily from a well-founded 
principle of treaty interpretation employed by most domestic 
courts—and ignored by the Seventh Circuit in Jogi—that there is a 
                                                        
46 Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 859. 
47 See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b) (―[A]uthorities shall inform the 
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.‖). 
48 Mora, 524 F.3d at 195–96. 
49 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1). 
50 VCCR, supra note 1, preamble. 
51 Mora, 524 F.3d at 195; see also Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 827 
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding that the preamble of the VCCR weighed against 
Article 36 containing individually enforceable rights); Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 859 
(same). But see Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
the preamble has no bearing on the enforcement of rights within the VCCR 
because it was primarily a statement of general purpose for the entire VCCR, 
and that a preamble is only a useful interpretive tool when ambiguity exists as is 
not the case in Article 36). 
52 480 F.3d at 833. 
53 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
54 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 834. 
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―presumption against inferring [enforceable individual] rights from 
international treaties.‖55 Given this presumption, any ambiguity or 
contradiction within the provisions of the treaty tips the scale 
against finding an enforceable right.
56
 As enunciated by the Sixth 
Circuit, ―[a]bsent express language in a treaty providing for 
particular judicial remedies, the federal courts will not vindicate 
private rights unless a treaty creates fundamental rights on a par 
with those protected by the Constitution.‖57 State courts have 
generally followed suit.
58
 
Congress‘ intent is another aspect of treaty interpretation that 
courts consider.
59
 The Ninth Circuit in Cornejo stated that the 
appropriate question to ask was ―whether, Congress, by ratifying 
the VCCR, intended to create private rights and remedies 
enforceable in American courts . . . .‖60 It seems counterintuitive 
                                                        
55 Gandara, 528 F.3d at 828 (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 907 cmt. a (1987) (―International agreements, even those directly benefiting 
private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private 
cause of action in domestic courts.‖); accord Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 
1346, 1357 n.3 (2008). But see Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 378 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the presumption against 
individually enforceable rights has no basis in any specific Supreme Court case). 
 56 See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(using the presumption against implying personal rights in international treaties 
to find that ―Article 36 rights belong to the party states‖ despite contradictory 
language in Article 36 and the Preamble). 
57 Id. at 390; see also United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the VCCR does ―not create any ‗fundamental rights‘ for 
a foreign national‖). 
58 See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) (holding that 
foreign nationals do not have standing to bring an action under the VCCR 
because ―treaties are between countries, not citizens‖); State v. Banda, 639 
S.E.2d 36, 43 (S.C. 2006) (―[I]nternational treaties do not create rights 
equivalent to constitutional rights . . . .‖). 
 59 E.g., Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 861–62 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
60 Id. This was one of several civil cases under section 1983 so the court 
analyzed the issue of enforceable rights within the context of private causes of 
action. Id. at 856. The Supreme Court enunciated the rule for determining 
whether a statute allowed for private individuals a cause of action under section 
1983 or similar statutes in Gonzaga University v. Doe. 536 U.S. 273, 283 
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that in ratifying the VCCR the Senate intended to confer rights on 
individuals because consular relations are peculiarly ―State-to-
State.‖61 Indeed, the courts have placed significant weight on the 
Senate Report concerning the VCCR which stated that ―[t]he 
[VCCR did] not change or affect present U.S. laws or practice.‖62 
Presumably, then, in the Senate‘s view, the VCCR also did not 
create any additional rights for foreign nationals under U.S. law.
63
 
The dissent in Cornejo argued that the majority in that case—
and courts using similar analysis—was asking the wrong 
question.
64
 Judge Nelson contended that the appropriate question is 
not Congress‘ intent in passing the VCCR, but whether the 
―ratifying Congress of the [VCCR] had an intent to confer 
individual rights in Article 36(1)(b).‖65  
Even if this is the correct question, it seems unlikely that it 
would change the decision of the majority of courts. First, the 
intent of the ratifying Congress is difficult to parse.
66
 Some 
representatives spoke of ―rights‖ during the discussion of Article 
36,
67
 but most of the discussion focused on the ability of receiving 
                                                        
(2002). To make this determination the Court looks for clear, unambiguous 
intent by the language or structure of the statute. Id. at 282–83. Treaties undergo 
a similar analysis, but must first pass the threshold question of whether or not 
they are self-executing. Cornejo, 504 F. 3d at 856. 
61 Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 861. 
62 United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sen. Doc. 
Exec. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)). 
 63 See id. at 64–65 (using the emphasis in Senate reports on the Preamble‘s 
assertion that the VCCR does not benefit individuals and the importance of 
maintaining the status quo expressed in Senate Committee Reports to support 
finding no individual rights conferred by Article 36). 
64 Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 864 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. 
 66 Compare U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. 
I, 2d Comm., 17th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 
1963) (comments by the Korean delegate) (noting the ―indispensable rights‖ of 
the foreign national), with U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official 
Record, Vol. I, 20th plen. mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.20 (Apr. 20, 
1963) (comments by the Egyptian delegate) (focusing on the burden of receiving 
States). 
67 E.g., U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d 
Comm., 17th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963) 
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States to implement the requirements of Article 36.
68
 That the 
delegates considered the interests of individuals does not 
necessarily lead to the inference that they also meant to confer 
judicially enforceable rights on individuals.
69
 In light of such 
ambiguity, domestic courts will rely on the presumption against 
individual rights.
70
  Second, the VCCR failed to mention any way 
in which individuals could seek redress.
71
 Even the Optional 
Protocol, which was ―designed to implement the terms of the 
[VCCR],‖ made no mention of private actions by detained 
individuals.
72
 Had the signatories contemplated the creation of 
individually enforceable rights, it would follow that some mention 
of an individual remedy would be included, at the very least, in the  
 
 
                                                        
(comments by the Korean delegate) (―[R]eceiving State‘s obligation under 
paragraph 1 (b) was extremely important, because it related to one of the 
fundamental and indispensable rights of the individual.‖); U.N. Conference on 
Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d Comm., 16th mtg. at 39, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.16 (Mar. 15, 1963) (comments by the United States 
delegate) (―The object of the amendment was to protect the rights of the national 
concerned . . . . [H]e might not like his consulate to be informed. To avoid such 
situations the United States proposed the words ‗at the request of a 
national . . . .‘‖). 
68 E.g., U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 
20th plen. mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.20 (Apr. 20, 1963) (comments 
by the Egyptian delegate) (noting that the revision of the consular notification 
provision providing that notification occur at the foreign national‘s request was 
meant ―to lessen the burden on the authorities of receiving States, especially 
those which had large numbers of resident aliens or which receive many tourists 
and visitors‖). 
69 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 19 n.4, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 
05-51, 04-10566), 2006 WL 271823 (―The ‗rights‘ to which the American 
delegate referred were not rights created by treaty, but ‗rights‘ that existed 
wholly independent of the draft convention, i.e., ‗the freedom of action of the 
detained persons who might not wish their consulate to be informed,‘ such as 
those seeking asylum.‖) (citing 1 U.N. Official Records 38 (para.21)).  
 70 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
71 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir. 2008). 
72 Id. at 197. 
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Optional Protocol.
73
 Again, this weighs against finding an 
individually enforceable right. 
 2.  Approach by the Executive Branch 
Because treaties are negotiated and enforced by the Executive 
Branch, the Executive Branch‘s interpretation of what is and is not 
created under a treaty should be given ―respectful consideration,‖ 
if not a greater level of deference.
74
 In fact, the Supreme Court 
generally affords ―great weight‖ to ―the meaning attributed to 
treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their 
negotiation and enforcement.‖75 The State Department has long 
taken the position that the VCCR does not confer any individual 
rights.
76
 When raising consular notification violations in other 
countries, the United States pursues diplomatic channels or 
addresses the arresting officials directly, but does not raise any 
arguments for a judicially enforceable right of the American 
citizen traveling abroad in the offending country‘s courts.77 When 
                                                        
 73 See id. (noting the absence of private actions by detained individuals as 
support for the finding that no individual enforceable rights are conferred by 
Article 36). 
74 In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that ―respectful 
consideration‖ was owed to any ruling of the ICJ. 548 U.S. 331, 356 (2006). At 
a minimum, the U.S. Executive Branch deserves at least the amount of 
deference owed an international judicial body. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v. 
Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (―Respect is ordinarily due the 
reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an 
international treaty.‖). 
75 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo 
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 (1982)); see also Kolovrat 
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).  
76 See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2000) (―The 
[VCCR] . . . establish[es] state-to-state rights and obligations . . . . [It does] 
not . . . establish[] the rights of individuals. The right of an individual to 
communicate with his consular official is derivative of the sending state‘s right 
to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular relations exist . . . .‖ 
(quoting the State Department‘s ―Answers to the Questions Posed by the First 
Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li‖)). 
77 See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25,  
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VCCR violations have come to the Supreme Court, the Executive 
Branch has repeatedly submitted amicus briefs reiterating its 
position against the existence of individual rights in the VCCR.
78
 
Similarly, when presenting its case to the ICJ, the United States 
has rejected the idea that the VCCR created any judicially 
enforceable rights.
79
 The United States‘ position in the ICJ has 
always been that the rights in the VCCR are purely state-to-state.
80
  
Further evidence of the Executive Branch‘s construction of the 
VCCR is found in the recent withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol.
81
 The withdrawal came shortly after an ICJ ruling against 
the United States.
82
 Some scholars have criticized the move as 
―sore-loser behavior;‖83 however, it reflects the view of the 
Executive Branch that when the United States entered the VCCR 
and Optional Protocol, it was under the belief that U.S. law 
incurred no major changes.
84
 As the ICJ ruled in ways that 
undermined this belief, the Executive Branch sought to prevent 
future rulings that would substantially change U.S. law.
85
 The 
                                                        
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51, 04-10566),  
2006 WL 271823. 
78 See id. (―The Executive Branch has never interpreted the [VCCR] to give 
a foreign national a judicially enforceable right . . . . ―); see also Brief for the 
U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22–23, Medellin v. Dretke, 
544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490. 
79 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 493–94 (June 27). 
80 Id. at 494 (―[R]ights of consular notification and access under the Vienna 
Convention are rights of States, not of individuals, even though these rights may 
benefit individuals by permitting States to offer them consular assistance.‖). 
 81 See supra note 25. 
82 The International Court of Justice found that the United States breached 
its VCCR obligations by not informing fifty-one Mexican nationals of their right 
to consular notification upon arrest and found that the ―appropriate reparation‖ 
was ―review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences‖ of the 
aforementioned Mexican nationals. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (March 31). 
83 Liptak, supra note 25 (quoting Peter J. Spiro, law professor at the 
University of Georgia). 
84 See supra note 76. 
85 Liptak, supra note 25 (stating that the decision to withdraw was made to 
―protect[] against future International Court of Justice judgments that might 
similarly interfere in ways [the U.S.] did not anticipate when [it] joined the 
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position of the Executive Branch weighs heavily against finding 
individual rights in the VCCR. 
 3.  Approach the Supreme Court Should Take 
The Court will certainly give ―respectful consideration‖ to the 
ICJ rulings,
86
 which found that the VCCR conferred an 
individually enforceable right on foreign nationals.
87
 However, 
U.S. courts interpret treaties under U.S. law.
88
 This is especially 
true of Article 36, which specifically states that ―[t]he rights 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in 
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.‖89 
If under U.S. law Article 36, as constructed and interpreted, 
confers no individual right, the Court must recognize this despite 
the ICJ interpretation.
90
 Most who argue in favor of individual 
rights, however, place great weight on the proviso of Article 36, 
paragraph 2—that ―full effect‖ be given to the VCCR.91 This 
position assumes that full effect cannot be given without a finding 
of individual rights in Article 36.
92
 However, the U.S. is perfectly 
capable of giving full effect to the VCCR without ascribing 
                                                        
optional protocol‖) (quoting State Department spokeswoman). 
86 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006). 
87 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (―Based on the 
text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates 
individual rights . . . .‖). 
88 See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (―Whether a 
treaty creates a right in an individual litigant that can be enforced in domestic 
proceedings by that litigant is for the court to decide as a matter of treaty 
interpretation.‖). 
89 VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2). 
 90 See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355 (holding that ICJ interpretations 
are entitled to ―respectful consideration‖ but are not binding on domestic 
courts). 
91 E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 12, Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2006 WL 598180; 
Carpenter, supra note 20, at 516–17. 
 92 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 20, at 517 (arguing that ―a Supreme 
Court precedent . . . is the only way to ensure the United States‘ adherence to 
VCCR Article 36(2)‖); Ray, supra note 12, at 1769. 
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judicially enforceable rights to Article 36.
93
 As such, the Supreme 
Court can and should find that the VCCR confers no individual 
rights.
94
 
B.  No Remedy Regardless 
Even if the Supreme Court found that the VCCR conferred 
individual rights on foreign nationals, its prior opinions and the 
previous opinions of many state courts and courts of appeals 
preclude any meaningful remedy from curing the violation.
95
 
Oftentimes where the rights of defendants in a criminal case are 
concerned, the purpose of a remedy is not solely curing the 
violation, but also deterring abhorrent police behavior.
96
 The 
VCCR does not include any specific remedial measures; therefore, 
remedies for such violations must be found in U.S. domestic law.
97
 
The remedies available in criminal prosecutions are inappropriate 
under U.S. law.
98
 Furthermore, to the extent that civil remedies are 
available, they, too, will prove inadequate in providing specific 
relief and/or deterrence.
99
 
1.  Criminal Challenges 
In a criminal prosecution, one of two judicial remedies is 
typically available to cure any prejudice that results from improper 
                                                        
 93 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 94 Accord Stransky, supra note 11, at 67–68 (using traditional treaty 
interpretive techniques to arrive at the same conclusion as the majority of circuit 
courts that no individual rights exist under the VCCR). 
 95 E.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350 (foreclosing the suppression of 
evidence as a remedy used by federal courts). 
96 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (suggesting that 
civil suits may act as a deterrent to police conduct that cannot be addressed 
through suppression of evidence); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 
(1984) (―[T]he the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police 
misconduct . . . .‖).  
97 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343 (pointing out that ―the implementation 
of Article 36 [is left] to domestic law‖). 
 98 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 99 See infra Part II.B.2. 
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police conduct: 1) suppression of evidence (―exclusionary rule‖) 
and 2) dismissal of indictment (or, if made post-conviction, 
overturning conviction).
100
 Both remedies carry great societal 
costs,
101
 but are sometimes necessary to protect individual 
rights.
102
 Therefore, just as the exclusionary rule is a ―last 
resort,‖103 so too is dismissal of a charge.104 The same principles 
and logic apply to either remedy.
105
  
The exclusionary rule originated as a ―protect[ion of] specific, 
constitutionally protected rights.‖106 Federal courts have 
acknowledged the possibility that the rule may extend to certain 
statutory rights that carry similar weight.
107
 Defendants argue that 
VCCR violations are on the same level as constitutional violations 
                                                        
 100 See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that 
these two remedies are available for violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments). 
101 Most courts speak of the cost-benefit analysis in the context of 
suppression of evidence, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 
U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998), but the same reasoning applies to any judicial remedy. 
The societal costs to consider are high, particularly the increased ―risk of 
releasing dangerous criminals‖ because incriminating evidence is suppressed. 
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595. 
 102 E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–80 (1966) (applying the 
exclusionary rule to Fifth Amendment violations); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 
(1961) (Fourth Amendment). 
103 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. 
 104 See United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
dismissal is a ―more drastic remedy‖ than suppression); Li, 206 F.3d at 61 
(asserting that suppression of evidence and the dismissal of an indictment are 
reserved for the ―most fundamental of rights‖). 
105 When defendants argue for both suppression or dismissal under the 
VCCR, the courts typically analyze the remedies contemporaneously. E.g., 
Page, 232 F.3d at 540–41; see also United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 
165–66 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing other circuit decisions against suppression in 
support of decision against dismissal). 
106 Page, 232 F.3d at 540 (citation and quotations omitted). 
107 United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 
2000) (―[A]n exclusionary remedy may be available for violations of provisions 
of law other than the Constitution.‖). 
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and thus, the exclusionary rule should apply.
108
 Federal courts have 
rejected this argument since the Supreme Court‘s suggestion in 
Breard that there may be some individual right in the VCCR.
109
 As 
early as 2000, the Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not a 
remedy for VCCR violations.
110
 Other circuit courts soon 
followed.
111
   
In making this determination, many courts have consulted the 
State Department for guidance.
112
 The State Department reported 
that it worked with law enforcement to implement the notification 
provision, which the Ninth Circuit noted as undermining the 
traditional justification for the exclusionary rule as the ―only 
available method of controlling police misconduct.‖113 Almost as 
compelling as the State Department‘s own policy were statements 
it made regarding treatment of the provision in other countries, 
since the treaty itself provided no direction as to what remedies 
should be available.
114
 The State Department reported that, to its 
knowledge, no other country utilized suppression as a remedy for 
VCCR violations.
115
 In fact, the State Department maintained that 
                                                        
108 United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining defendant‘s argument that ―consular . . . notification is a 
‗fundamental right‘ . . . which merits protection through use of the exclusionary 
rule‖). 
109 Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 (refusing to afford consular notification 
the same level of protection as Miranda rights). See also De La Pava, 268 F.3d 
at 165 (holding that the ―consular notification provision . . . [does] not create 
any ‗fundamental rights‘ . . . . [And a]ccordingly . . . is not the basis for a 
dismissal‖) (citation omitted).  
110 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888. 
 111 E.g., Page, 232 F.3d at 541; United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st 
Cir. 2000). 
 112 E.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887; Li, 206 F.3d at 66. 
113 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887–88. 
114 Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (noting that statements by Department officials and 
other countries‘ practices ―evidence a belief . . . [that VCCR violations] do not 
warrant suppression‖); Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 393 (citing Li for a similar 
proposition). 
115 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888 (noting that two countries 
explicitly rejected suppression); Li, 206 F.3d at 65 (citing State Department 
statement that it knows of no countries who use their criminal justice systems to 
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standard practice at the time was an investigation and formal 
apology with a promise to increase efforts to prevent future 
violations.
116
  
In its own analysis, the Ninth Circuit also pointed to the lack of 
connection between consular notification and police 
interrogation.
117
 Proponents of the exclusionary rule‘s application 
to VCCR violations often analogize the rights of the VCCR to 
Miranda rights.
118
 As the court noted, however, consular 
notification, as described in the treaty, does not guarantee anything 
more than the notification of the foreign national‘s consulate.119 
The consulate is not compelled to assist by providing counsel or 
resources,
120
 nor are the police compelled to ―cease interrogation 
once the right is invoked.‖121 Therefore, the exclusionary rule 
―does not further the treaty‘s purposes.‖122 By the end of 2001, 
relying on the same or very similar reasoning, half of the Federal 
Courts of Appeals found that the exclusionary rule was an 
inappropriate remedy for Article 36 violations.
123
 
                                                        
rectify VCCR violations). 
116 Li, 206 F.3d at 65. 
117 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886. 
118 Id. at 887 (reiterating defendant‘s argument that Article 36 protections 
are analogous to Miranda rights); United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 
198 (5th Cir. 2001) (reiterating a similar argument by defendant); see also, 
Elizabeth Samson, Revisiting Miranda After Avena: The Implications of Mexico 
v. United States of America for the Implementation of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations in the United States, 29 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1068, 1123–24 
(2006) (equating Miranda rights with the right to consular notification). 
119 See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886. 
120 Article 36 deals solely with notification by the receiving state. See 
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36. There is no language that suggests any duties that 
the consulate then has to its national. See id. 
121 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886. 
122 Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199. 
123 E.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2000); Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199; 
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888; United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 
226 F.3d 616, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 
F.3d 1194, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. De La Pava, 268 
F.3d 157, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to dismiss an indictment based on the 
VCCR). 
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The Supreme Court finally took up the issue in Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon in 2006.
124
 By assuming, without finding, that 
the VCCR conferred individual rights, the Court rejected Sanchez-
Llamas‘ claim that his statements to the police should have been 
suppressed because he was never informed of his right to consular 
notification.
125
 The Court‘s approach in rejecting this argument 
was two-fold: 1) the Court held that it could not require 
suppression as a rule for violations of the VCCR by state courts 
applying state criminal law and 2) even if the Court could impose 
suppression on the states, it did not feel suppression was the proper 
remedy.
126
 
On the premise that the Court generally does ―not hold [] 
supervisory power over the courts of the several States‖127 and 
―may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional 
dimension,‖128 the Court found that it could only intervene in 
Sanchez-Llamas (or any state criminal case) if the VCCR provided 
a specific judicial remedy.
129
 It is clear from the text of the VCCR, 
and specifically Article 36, that no such remedy exists in the 
VCCR itself.
130
 As such, the Court concluded that it could not 
require suppression because to do so would ―enlarg[e] the 
obligations of the United States under the [VCCR].‖131 
The Court, however, continued its examination of the issue of 
suppression—presumably to establish accord with the findings of 
the circuit courts.
132
 The Court reiterated that ―there is . . . little 
connection between an Article 36 violation and evidence or 
statements obtained by police.‖133 In other words, there is no 
                                                        
 124 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). 
128 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).  
129 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346. 
130 See generally VCCR, supra note 1. 
131 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346. 
 132 See id.; see also id. at 350 (noting that foreign nationals are afforded the 
same Due Process protections as citizens and that these protections ―safeguard 
the same interests . . . [as] Article 36‖). 
133 Id. at 349. 
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prejudice inflicted on a foreign national whose Article 36 rights are 
violated that must be cured by suppressing evidence.
134
 
Furthermore, deterrence is ill-served by suppressing evidence 
based on VCCR violations.
135
 As the Court eloquently noted, ―the 
failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely, 
with any frequency, to produce unreliable confessions . . . . 
[P]olice win little, if any, practical advantage from violating 
Article 36. Suppression would be a vastly disproportionate remedy 
for an Article 36 violation.‖136 Accordingly, the decision of the 
Supreme Court basically precludes suppression for VCCR 
violations in the federal system.
137
 
Even after Sanchez-Llamas, states may choose suppression as a 
remedy for Article 36 violations,
138
 but this course of action seems 
unlikely. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas—with one exception139—state 
courts confronted with the issue of suppression for VCCR 
violations concluded that suppression was not a suitable remedy 
                                                        
 134 See id. 
 135 See id. 
136 Id. The Court is referring to the cost-benefit analysis articulated in other 
cases that employ the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & 
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 357–58 (1998). Although the Court does not fully 
articulate its reasoning, implicit in this statement is consideration of what benefit 
protecting these interests has on society, and what costs protecting these 
interests has on society. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006) 
(―[T]he value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to 
commit the forbidden act.‖). 
 137 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350 (―[N]either the [VCCR] itself nor our 
precedents applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of Sanchez-
Llamas‘ statements to police.‖). 
 138 The Supreme Court‘s decision is binding on state courts only insofar as 
its interpretation that the VCCR itself does not require suppression because the 
Court declined to use its supervisory power to render this decision. See id. at 
346. Individual state courts may incorporate ―international law through their 
independent common lawmaking powers.‖ Julian G. Ku, The State of New York 
Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 457, 476 (2004). 
139 State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999), overruled as 
recognized by State v. Vasquez, No. CR.A.98-01-0317-R2, 2001 WL 755930, at 
*1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 2001) (unpublished opinion). 
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regardless of whether or not there was an individual right.
140
 The 
decision in Sanchez-Llamas does nothing to persuade state courts 
that their initial analyses on this issue were wrong.
141
 Indeed, post-
Sanchez-Llamas, state courts continue to deny suppression of 
evidence for VCCR violations.
142
 State court judges may even 
―feel bound by the application of a federal treaty by the federal 
courts.‖143 Many states have their own versions of the exclusionary 
rule that is applied under state law, but even with these rules, 
VCCR challenges fail the suppression test.
144
 Therefore, even 
though the Supreme Court‘s decision was not binding on state 
                                                        
140 E.g., People v. Corona, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that suppression is not an available remedy for Article 36 violations); 
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003) (holding that ―suppression . . . is 
not an appropriate remedy . . . for an [A]rticle 36‖ violation); State v. Quintero, 
No. M2003-02311-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Apr. 22, 2005) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to an Article 36 
violation); Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 707 (Va. 2002) (same as 
Conde). 
 141 The reasons given by the Supreme Court to find that violation of the 
VCCR does not warrant suppression as a remedy are factors that state courts 
will also consider. Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 347–50 (discussion of 
suppression as a remedy), with Bell, 563 S.E.2d at 707 (brief discussion of the 
same). 
142 E.g., People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 31–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (―If 
it is improper for the Supreme Court to enlarge the obligations of the United 
States under the VCCR, it would arguably be worse for this court to do so. In 
sum, defendant has not offered any persuasive reason for this court to abandon 
our prior case law and impose the exclusionary rule in cases of alleged Article 
36 violations.‖); State v. Morales-Mulato, 744 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008) (reaffirming its decision prior to Sanchez-Llamas that suppression is not 
an appropriate remedy). 
143 People v. Aybar, No. 7052/95, 2006 WL 2918218, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 12, 2006). 
144 E.g., State v. Cabrera, 903 A.2d 427, 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2006) (―To the extent state courts may apply their own rules of law, the 
[VCCR], which provides only for notification . . . presents no basis for either 
requiring the suppression of evidence for noncompliance, development of 
independent rules of law, or departure from the law as it now stands in New 
Jersey . . . .‖); Sierra v. State, 218 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting 
that Article 36 violations do not warrant suppression under the state 
exclusionary rule). 
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courts, the exclusionary rule will continue to be denied as a remedy 
for Article 36 violations.
145
 
2.  Civil Remedies  
In the absence of a satisfactory remedy in criminal 
prosecutions, foreign nationals can sue the state and municipal 
actors who allegedly violated their VCCR rights.
146
 There may, 
indeed, be some deterrent value in pursuing civil liability for police 
misconduct.
147
 There are two federal statutes through which 
foreign nationals can potentially seek redress for Article 36 
violations: 1) Alien Tort Statute (―ATS‖), 28 U.S.C. § 1350148 and 
2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
149
 
                                                        
145 As noted by the Court in Sanchez-Llamas, Article 36 violations may be 
considered as a factor in a broader challenge to voluntariness of statements or 
effectiveness of counsel. 548 U.S. at 350. Some state courts have encountered 
such challenges and, thus far, defendants have been unable to leverage Article 
36 violations effectively in voluntariness and effective counsel challenges. See, 
e.g., Anaya-Plasencia v. State, 642 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) 
(denying claim that Article 36 violation ―rendered [defendant‘s] statement 
involuntary‖); see also Lugo v. State, No. SC06-1532, 2008 WL 4489274, at 
*17 (Fla. Oct. 8, 2008) (denying ineffective counsel claim based on failure to 
raise issue of VCCR violation at trial court ―since trial counsel is not ineffective 
for the failure to raise [the] nonmeritorious issue‖). 
 146 Federal statutes allow civil suits against state actors who violate the 
Constitution or its treaties. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
147 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (suggesting that 
―civil liability is an effective deterrent . . .‖). 
148 28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: ―The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖ The ATS confers more 
than jurisdiction; it allows courts to ―recognize private causes of action for 
certain torts in violation of the law of nations . . . .‖ Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
149 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
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 a.  Alien Tort Statute 
Claims made pursuant to the ATS must be supported by a 
―customary international law tort‖ that is ―both specific and well-
accepted.‖150 It is, however, unlikely that any defendant will be 
able to establish a customary international law tort based on an 
Article 36 violation given this high bar.
151
 First, ―[a] violation of 
Article 36(1)(b)(third) by itself would not meet the specificity 
requirement for recognition of an ATS cause of action.‖152 The 
Second Circuit—the only circuit court to reach the issue—
considered and rejected a version of an ―unlawful detention‖ tort 
because it was not ―well-accepted‖ in the international 
community.
153
 Thus, it seems that ATS is unavailable to foreign 
nationals seeking to pursue civil liability for VCCR violations.
154
 
 b.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Claims brought under section 1983 seem more promising.
155
 
                                                        
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‘s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
150 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 725). 
 151 See id. (―[O]nly a ‗modest number‘ of customary international law torts 
are cognizable under the ATS . . . [in part because of] the ‗collateral 
consequences of making international rules privately actionable . . . .‘‖ (quoting 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725)). 
152 Id. at 208 n.31 (analyzing the possibility of a cause of action under the 
ATS within the Sosa framework). 
153 Id. at 208–09. 
 154 See id. 
 155 A plaintiff need only establish that an individual right exists to bring a 
cause of action under section 1983. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 
(2002). When a treaty is the basis for a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must 
also establish that the treaty is self-executing. Cornejo v. San Diego, 504 F.3d 
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Assuming arguendo that an individually enforceable right exists 
under Article 36, that right is automatically enforceable under 
section 1983.
156
 The cause of action, then, simply becomes the 
violation of Article 36 for which the foreign national would be 
entitled to civil damages.
157
 The issue, however, is that law 
enforcement officials will almost inevitably raise the well-
established affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
158
 
Typically, qualified immunity shields law enforcement officials 
from civil liability so long as ―their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.‖159 The rationale behind the 
availability of such a defense is not merely to protect individual 
defendants, but society as a whole.
160
 When government officials 
are sued, society bears the costs of litigation, the diversion of 
government resources, and the deterrence of potential public 
servants.
161
 Courts presented with these suits must weigh not only 
the value of allowing civil liability for the violation to the litigants, 
but to all of society.
162
 As a result, decisions about the validity of a 
qualified immunity defense must be made early in the litigation.
163
 
                                                        
853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007). Even though the Supreme Court has yet to rule 
definitively, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008), the lower 
courts assume that the VCCR is self-executing. E.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528 
F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, it is easier to establish a cause of action 
under section 1983 than the ATS where the plaintiff must establish a customary 
international law tort. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
156 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (―Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a 
statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by 
§ 1983.‖). 
 157 See supra note 155 (detailed discussion of section 1983 requirements). 
158 The only circuit court to find an individually enforceable right and allow 
a suit under section 1983 noted the potential use of this defense. Jogi v. Voges, 
480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2007). 
159 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 160 Id. at 814. 
161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (noting that qualified 
immunity is meant to ―spare [defendants] not only unwarranted liability, but 
unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn 
out lawsuit‖) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). 
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As such, the threat of suit may well serve as a sufficient deterrent 
when the alleged violation was of a clearly established right.
164
 
However, rights under Article 36 can hardly be described as 
clearly established.
165
 Supreme Court precedent is not necessary to 
clearly establish a right,
166
 but ―[t]he contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right.‖167 Given that judges cannot 
find common ground on the issue of what Article 36 guarantees an 
individual, it seems unreasonable to expect law enforcement 
officers to know what rights exist under Article 36.
168
 The 
likelihood of a successful qualified immunity defense early-on in 
litigation,
169
 therefore, seems likely to nullify any potential 
deterrent effects and prevent individuals from successfully 
recovering damages to cure specific violations of the VCCR. 
Courts could potentially make an exception to qualified 
immunity for the implementation of treaty rights with the idea of 
compliance in mind.
170
 As noted by one scholar, ―[i]f the United 
States uses private judicial enforcement to achieve the same result 
another nation could achieve by executive decree, it has not done 
any more vis-à-vis its international obligations than the other 
nation.‖171 The use of private remedies, though, imposes greater 
                                                        
164 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006). 
 165 See discussion supra Part II.A.  
166 See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (―This is not to say that an 
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful.‖) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)). 
167 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 168 See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617–18 (―If judges [] disagree on a 
constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for 
picking the losing side of the controversy.‖). 
 169 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting the basis for 
allowing qualified immunity is to allow ―insubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly 
terminated‖). 
 170 E.g., Chaney v. Orlando, 291 Fed. Appx. 238, 244 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(noting a narrow exception to qualified immunity whereby an ―officer‘s conduct 
[is] so outrageous as to be unconstitutional ‗even without case law on point‘‖) 
(quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
171 Recent Case: Foreign Relations Law -- Treaty Remedies -- Ninth Circuit 
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costs on society than necessary to ensure compliance.
172
 Other 
methods of ensuring compliance not only impose fewer costs on 
society as a whole, but can be just as effective, if not more so, in 
enforcing the VCCR domestically.
173
 
III.  ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITHOUT JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
There is no denying that under some circumstances, judicial 
remedies are the most effective means of ensuring the protection of 
citizens and indeed non-citizens throughout a criminal 
prosecution.
174
 The available remedies, however, often come at an 
extremely high cost to society.
175
 As such, courts have always been 
reluctant to apply those remedies except to protect the most 
fundamental rights from the most abhorrent police behavior.
176
 
Any right provided to a foreign national under Article 36 does not 
rise to that level, nor does a violation of that ―right.‖177 As an 
international treaty obligation, though, it is essential that the 
United States comply with Article 36.
178
  
                                                        
Holds that § 1983 Does Not Provide a Right of Action for Violations of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1683 
(2008). 
172 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 173 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 174 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (―As with any 
remedial device, the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to 
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
served.‖). 
 175 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006) (discussing the high 
cost of the exclusionary rule); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) 
(discussing the high cost of civil liability). 
 176 E.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to 
the ―knock-and-announce‖ requirement). 
 177 See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that Article 36 does not establish any fundamental rights on the level of 
constitutional rights). 
 178 See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (recognizing the 
United States‘ compelling interest in ―ensuring the reciprocal observance of the 
[VCCR], protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating 
commitment to the role of international law‖); see also Asa W. Markel, 
International Law and Consular Immunity, 43 ARIZ ATT‘Y 22, 22 (2007) 
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A.  Current Federal and State Policies 
The federal government has taken steps toward ensuring 
compliance among its own law enforcement agencies through 
executive regulations.
179
 For example, the Department of Justice 
(―DOJ‖) requires that arresting officers inform every foreign 
national that his or her consulate can be notified if he or she so 
requests.
180
 The officer must then report to the nearest United 
States Attorney‘s Office (―USAO‖), which must then either notify 
the appropriate consulate as requested or even where not requested 
as mandated by treaty.
181
 The law enforcement agencies and 
USAOs, as agencies under the DOJ, are directly accountable to the 
DOJ for any compliance issues.
182
 This scheme ensures 
compliance through the supervisory relationship of the DOJ to its 
subsidiary agencies—USAOs and law enforcement agencies (i.e. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, 
etc.).
183
 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has 
adopted its own procedures to meet the consular notification 
requirements.
184
 Because federal law enforcement answers directly 
to the United States government, these measures ensure 
compliance by such agencies.
185
 
The federal system accounts for only a small portion of total 
arrests in the country and thus, it can reasonably be concluded that 
federal law enforcement‘s compliance with the VCCR affects a 
very small portion of the foreign nationals arrested on U.S. soil.
186
 
                                                        
(―[I]nternational law . . . is based on reciprocity between nations.‖); Samson, 
supra note 118, at 1112 (―When Nations sign treaties, they do so with the good 
faith belief that the other signatories will uphold their obligations.‖). 
 179 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2007). 
180 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1). 
181 28 C.F.R. § 50.5. 
 182 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.5 (1997) (noting the supervisory power of the 
Attorney General over all of DOJ including the U.S. Attorneys). 
 183 28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (2007) (listing the agencies under DOJ). 
184 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (Department of Homeland Security). 
 185 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (directing compliance by DOJ agencies with the 
VCCR). 
186 ―The federal government estimates it makes about 140,000 arrests each 
year.‖ Feds to Collect DNA in Every Arrest, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2008, 
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Given this assumption, the vast majority of foreign nationals, 
therefore, fall under the jurisdiction of the states.
187
 As such, the 
United States Department of State (―State Department‖) has taken 
an active role in helping states implement the requirements of 
Article 36 and similar provisions in other treaties that address 
consular notification.
188
 The State Department maintains a 
comprehensive website to convey its views about consular 
notification, to describe the consular notification requirements of 
applicable treaties, and to assist state and local law enforcement in 
complying with the requirements.
189
 The website admonishes the 
government officials for whom the site is designed that their 
―cooperation in ensuring that foreign nationals in the United States 
are treated in accordance with these instructions permits the United 
States to comply with its consular legal obligations domestically 
and will ensure that the United States can insist upon rigorous 
compliance by foreign governments with respect to U.S. citizens 
abroad.‖190 In addressing failure to notify, the State Department 
asserts that it will ―take appropriate action‖ by investigating 
complaints and intervening as necessary to ensure compliance and 
address the concerns of the sending state.
191
 The State Department 
                                                        
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-04-16-fed-dna_N.htm (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2009). By contrast, the federal government estimates over 
fourteen million total arrests in the United States each year. See U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States 2007, Table 29, Sept. 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/ 
data/table_29.html. 
 187 See supra note 186. 
188 In addition to the VCCR, the United States is a signatory of agreements 
with over fifty countries that mandate consular notification upon detaining a 
foreign national, not withstanding any wishes against notification that a foreign 
national may have. United States Department of State, Consular Notification and 
Access, Part 5: Legal Material, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular 
_744.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). For a list of countries covered by such 
bilateral treaties, please see the State Department website. Id. 
189 See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification 
and Access, http://travel.state. gov/law/consular/consular_753.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2009). 
190 Id.   
191 United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access, 
Part 3: FAQs, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_748.html (last visited 
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suggests that the proper response is either immediate notification 
as soon as the agency is aware of the failure so that the consulate 
can exercise its rights, or an apology to the sending state and 
efforts to prevent future breaches.
192
  
The website also provides law enforcement officials with the 
relevant background information on consular notification, 
including a brief explanation of the VCCR, the text of Article 36, 
and State Department‘s views on the basis for implementing it.193 
In reference to implementing the VCCR, the State Department 
asserts that the Supremacy Clause binds all federal, state and local 
law enforcement officials to comply with the VCCR and that this 
is best accomplished through directives, orders, and police manuals 
issued by individual jurisdictions.
194
 Given this policy, the website 
provides ample resources to law enforcement officials to 
implement consular notification.
195
 The website allows 
government officials of any federal, state, or local agency to order, 
free of charge, ―Consular Notification and Access‖ booklets, 
training videos, consular notification pocket cards, and a CD-ROM 
with training materials.
196
 The booklets and the pocket cards 
contain suggested wording for notifying foreign nationals of the 
consular notification provision
197
 and the website and CD-ROM 
                                                        
Feb. 17, 2009). 
192 Id.  
193 See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification 
and Access, Part 5: Legal Material, supra note 188. 
194 Id. 
 195 See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification 
and Access, supra note 189. 
196 United States Department of State, Consular Notification Materials 
Order Form, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_726.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2009). The information contained in all of these materials is also 
available on the website itself. See generally United States Department of State, 
Consular Notification and Access, supra note 189. 
197 The State Department promulgates two suggested wordings, one based 
on the VCCR where notification is optional per the foreign national‘s discretion 
and the other based on the bilateral treaties where notification is mandatory. 
United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access, Part 1: 
Basic Instructions, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_737.html (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
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make versions of this wording available in other languages.
198
 The 
State Department further eases the burden on law enforcement 
officials by including the contact information for all consulate 
offices and a form fax sheet to notify those offices.
199
 It also 
engages in outreach and training around the country to educate law 
enforcement about the notification requirements and improve 
compliance.
200
 As evidenced by the multitude of information, 
policy statements, and resources on the State Department website, 
the federal government is committed to ensuring compliance and 
has made significant steps toward compliance, thus far, without the 
use of judicial remedies.
201
 
Law enforcement agencies have, on their own, shown a 
commitment to increasing compliance with the consular 
notification requirements. The Commission on Accreditation for 
Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (―CALEA‖)202 adopted a 
consular notification and access (―CNA‖) standard that will now 
be required for accredited law enforcement agencies.
203
 This 
                                                        
198 United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access, 
Part 4: Translations, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_749.html (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
199 United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access, 
Part Six: Foreign Embassies and Consulates in the United States, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_745.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009). 
200 United States Department of State, Training and Outreach, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_2244.html (last visited Feb. 17, 
2009). The Department has conducted approximately 450 training sessions, 
―distributed over 1,000,000 pieces of training materials,‖ and published articles 
in law enforcement publications to raise awareness. Id. 
 201 See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification 
and Access, supra note 189. 
202 The CALEA is a credentialing authority established in 1979 by four 
major law enforcement associations ―to improve the delivery of public safety 
services, primarily by: maintaining a body of standards, developed by public 
safety practitioners, covering a wide range of up-to-date public safety initiatives; 
establishing and administering an accreditation process; and recognizing 
professional excellence.‖ Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Inc., About CALEA, http://www.calea.org/Online/AboutCALEA/ 
Commission.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter CALEA]. 
203 See generally Mark Warren, Consular Notification: Statutory and 
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standard requires agencies to adopt Standard Operating Procedures 
that ensure compliance with the VCCR and other consular 
notification agreements.
204
 While CALEA membership is 
voluntary, its members represent more than 80% of law 
enforcement agencies in the United States; as such, its views 
represent a significant portion of law enforcement.
205
 The CNA 
standard, in particular, demonstrates the growing knowledge of 
consular notification and general willingness and desire of the law 
enforcement community to bring agencies into compliance.
206
 
To date, two state legislatures have taken steps to ensure 
compliance by their own law enforcement officials by codifying 
procedures for consular notification: California and Oregon.
207
 
Other states, most notably Georgia, have utilized official law 
enforcement manuals to implement consular notification.
208
 In 
some cases, specific local police departments have utilized their 
own patrol manuals to implement notification.
209
 It is clear that 
strides are being made in the area of consular notification 
                                                        
Regulatory Provisions, http://users.xplornet.com/~mwarren/compliance.htm 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009). 
204 See id. (citing the CALEA standard in its entirety). The State 
Department prepared a model CNA Standard Operating Procedure (―SOP‖) for 
use by any government agency; the State Department recommends that every 
agency use this model or develop similar SOPs regardless of their affiliation 
with CALEA. United States Department of State, Download a Model CNA 
Standard Operating Procedure, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular 
_3002.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
205 United States Department of State, Training and Outreach, supra note 
200.   
 206 The Supreme Court recently noted that the increase in the 
―professionalism of police forces, including internal police discipline‖ acts as a 
civil rights violations deterrent. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006). 
CALEA is an example of the increased professionalism and its adoption of the 
CNA acts similarly as a deterrent for consular notification violations. See 
CALEA, supra note 202. 
207 Warren, supra note 203. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (West 
2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (2008). 
208 See Warren, supra note 203. 
209 See id. (listing the manuals of New York Police Department, Los 
Angeles Police Department, and Lubbock (Texas) Independent School District 
Police). 
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compliance within the United States at the federal, state, and local 
levels.
210
 This is not to say, however, that there is no room for 
improvement. 
B.  Trust the States to Fill the Gap 
The federal government is ultimately liable for the failure of 
state and local agencies to abide by the terms of the VCCR; 
however, that does not mean that only the federal government can 
effectively enforce the provisions of the VCCR.
211
 Because the 
majority of all arrests are under state jurisdiction, the arrests of 
most foreign nationals—and thus, violations of Article 36—also 
fall under state jurisdiction.
212
 Therefore, Article 36 compliance is 
best left primarily in the hands of the states because: 1) the ways in 
which the federal government can compel compliance will be less 
effective and less efficient than allowing the states to deal with the 
issue on their own, and 2) under our federalist system, the states 
often take an active role in treaty implementation and Article 36 
particularly warrants such a state role. 
The federal government‘s hands are virtually tied by state 
sovereignty under the current system.
213
 Having ruled out judicial 
remedies as a means of enforcement,
214
 the legislative and 
                                                        
210 It should be noted that the methods of compliance employed by federal 
and state agencies closely mimic the efforts in other countries who are party to 
the VCCR. See id. (listing various foreign codes that address implementation of 
the VCCR). Some countries, for instance Australia, require notification prior to 
questioning, but this goes beyond the requirements of the VCCR, which 
prescribed nothing more than notification without undue delay. See id. 
 211  See Ku, supra note 138, at 521 (giving examples of states enforcing 
international obligations). 
 212 See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text. 
 213 Federal courts cannot use their supervisory power to force states into 
compliance. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). It is 
beyond Congress‘ power to regulate state criminal laws and procedures. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 214 A bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 6481: Avena 
Case Implementation Act of 2008, proposes ―to create a civil action to provide 
judicial remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the [U.S.] under the 
[VCCR].‖ Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong. 
LEE_6-5-09 6/6/2009  12:59 PM 
644 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
executive branches have few viable options to enforce the VCCR 
directly. Congress could authorize and require a federal agency to 
interview all new inmates in state facilities to determine their 
citizenship status.
215
 While this solution would certainly guarantee 
that every foreign national is given the option of consular 
notification, the practicality of such a scheme seems shaky at 
best.
216
 To screen every one of the fourteen million arrestees each 
year would require an enormous amount of manpower and 
money.
217
 Moreover, there are no statistics indicating what 
percentage of these arrests are of foreign nationals, so this extreme 
expenditure of time and money may only be beneficial to a small 
percentage of all arrestees.
218
 Without concrete proof, or even a 
suggestion, that the benefits would be much more substantial, this 
seems an impractical solution. Congress cannot go much further 
than this to directly enforce the VCCR in state arrests because 
Congress cannot mandate that state courts apply specific 
procedural rules, nor can it require state legislatures to amend their 
criminal laws and procedures.
219
  
                                                        
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-6481 
(last visited February 12, 2009). The bill was introduced in July 2008 and has 
been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. The bill is tailored 
specifically to remedy Article 36 violations. Id. 
215 Molora Vadnais, Comment, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument 
Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 336 (1999). 
 216 See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime 
in the United States 2007, Table 29, supra note 186. 
217 See id. 
 218 The federal government and state governments keep statistics of all 
arrests, but while these statistics include a breakdown of arrests by types of 
crime, age, and region, these reports do not include a breakdown of arrests by 
nationality or citizenship status. E.g., Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Crime in the United States 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr 
/cius2007/arrests/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009); California Office of the 
Attorney General, Arrests Statistics, http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statistics 
datatabs/dtabsarrests.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2009); New York Division of 
Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Statistics, http://criminaljustice. 
state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). 
219 This is outside the scope of Congress‘ constitutional authority. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8.   
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Likewise, there is little that the Executive Branch can do to 
directly enforce adherence to Article 36 by state officials.
220
 The 
Attorney General could bring suits against offending states as it 
has done in the past when state and local governments have 
violated treaty obligations.
221
 Indeed, this solution could be an 
effective deterrent to violations of Article 36, but it will result in 
costly litigation, which will ultimately cost taxpayer dollars on the 
local, state, and federal level.
222
 It would be more efficient and 
cost-effective to prevent violations from the outset than 
retroactively sue every offending locality.
223
 
While there is not much that the federal government can do to 
directly enforce the VCCR, actions taken by the federal 
government can indirectly impact the enforcement of the VCCR in 
state criminal systems.
224
 By enacting a consular notification 
funding statute, Congress can provide incentives to states that will 
encourage compliance.
225
 For instance, Congress could implement 
a consular notification program that would require states to issue 
reports regarding foreign nationals‘ arrests and to provide 
documentation of action taken regarding consular notification; in 
exchange, Congress would provide funds to support those 
procedures.
226
 The Executive Branch, via the State Department, 
                                                        
 220 See Samson, supra note 118, at 1118 (enumerating ways in which the 
Executive Branch could ensure compliance). 
221 Id. 
 222 The costs of litigation instituted by the Attorney General against state 
entities will be similar to at least the monetary expense and diversion of 
resources discussed in context of traditional civil remedies. See Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). 
 223 See Mark J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, 
The Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1185, 1228 (2006) 
(suggesting that preventative efforts are an effective means of enforcing Article 
36). 
 224 See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 336 (enumerating actions Congress can 
take to directly and indirectly impact compliance). 
225 Id. 
226 This is the basic structure of any congressional funding statute designed 
to bring states into compliance with burdensome regulations. For example, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA) provides 
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has already taken steps to indirectly impact the enforcement of the 
VCCR by raising awareness of the provision, and providing 
training and materials to state and local officials to ease the burden 
of compliance.
227
 
Ultimately, though, the federal government need not and 
should not go any farther to implement the requirements of the 
VCCR among state and local jurisdictions. The consular 
notification provision directly affects the states‘ individual 
criminal justice systems, since it requires that every arrested or 
detained foreign national within the United States border have the 
option of notifying his or her consulate.
228
 Each state sets and 
adheres to its own criminal law and procedures.
229
 Because the 
criminal law is entirely an issue of each state‘s jurisdiction, states 
are the proper authority to address the consular notification 
provision.
230
 State control in implementing foreign policy is by no 
means a novel idea—historically, states have independently 
handled issues of ―consular powers in estate proceedings [and] the 
immunity of foreign states from taxation . . . .‖231 In modern times, 
aside from consular notification obligations, states are also 
responsible for implementing the requirements of international 
human rights treaties.
232
 As argued by one scholar, ―the reason the 
states hold that power is because the foreign policy question[s] 
                                                        
funding to states that follow prescribed rules and regulations regarding services 
provided to children with disabilities. See Individual with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1407, 1411–13, 1415–19 (2004). 
 227 See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
228 See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36. 
 229 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. 
KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  § 1.2(b) (3d ed. 2008).  
 230 See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 312 (noting the constitutional quandary 
in having state officers implement the VCCR pursuant to some congressional or 
federal court mandate). 
231 Ku, supra note 138, at 478. 
232 Id. at 521 (citing a declaration by Congress that accompanied 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that 
interpreted the agreement as binding the federal government on matters within 
its jurisdiction and leaving implementation of matters within state jurisdiction to 
states with the caveat that the federal government ―take measures for the 
fulfillment‖ of those obligations). 
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directly implicate[] matter[s] of state control.‖233 This scholar 
contends that in leaving these issues to the states, the federal 
government is acknowledging the importance of state 
sovereignty.
234
 Barring some need for absolute uniformity, there is 
no need for the federal government to directly implement the 
requirements of Article 36 and ignore state sovereignty over their 
own criminal justice systems.
235
 
Absolute uniformity in implementing the consular notification 
provision is not a necessity since the VCCR itself speaks only very 
broadly about what receiving states must do with respect to 
consular notification.
236
 This suggests that each receiving state has 
the power to devise its own procedures for implementation under 
the treaty—suggesting that uniformity of implementation is not 
necessary under the VCCR.
237
 Thus, there is no reason that every 
state within the United States must utilize the same procedures.
238
 
As such, states should be allowed to continue to implement the 
provision as they see fit. 
Arguments in favor of judicial remedies or direct intervention 
by the federal government in the case of Article 36 inevitably 
assume that states, left to their own devices, will not comply.
239
 
According to one legal scholar, state noncompliance stems from: 
1) lack of knowledge on the part of law enforcement officials, 
                                                        
233 Id. at 520. 
234 Id. 
 235 See Kathleen Patchel, Memorandum to Participants in October 7, 2007 
Informational Meeting Regarding Treaty Implementation, at 8 (Sept. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/jeb/patchel_memo.pdf 
(noting that where lack of uniformity is not problematic, state implementation 
may be a ―reasonable and feasible alternative‖). 
 236 See VCCR, supra note 1. 
237 See id. 
238 See Patchel, supra note 235, at 8 (noting that where lack of uniformity is 
not problematic, state implementation may be a ―reasonable and feasible 
alternative‖). 
239 E.g., Asa Markel, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: After 
the Federal Courts’ Abdication, Will State Courts Fill in the Breach?, 7 CHI.-
KENT J. INT‘L COMP. L. 1, 30 (2007) (implying that the Supreme Court‘s holding 
in Sanchez-Llamas in favor of states‘ rights will adversely affect U.S. treaty 
obligations of the VCCR). 
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2) inability or unwillingness to bear the burden of notifying foreign 
nationals, 3) difficulty in distinguishing between citizens and 
foreign nationals due to the diversity of American citizens, and 
4) failure from the outset by the federal and, by default, state 
governments to take the notification requirements seriously.
240
 
However, these issues have either already been extinguished or are 
easily addressed. 
Both the first and last issues—lack of knowledge and failure to 
take the requirements seriously—no longer exist.241 Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon and Medellin v. Texas
242
 have brought both 
national and international attention to the requirements of Article 
36.
243
 Should state officials somehow have missed these important 
cases, the State Department took steps to put state officials on 
notice of the consular notification provision.
244
 These steps by the 
State Department not only ensure that officials are aware of the 
provision, but also exemplify the federal government‘s 
                                                        
240 Vadnais, supra note 215, at 332–33. 
 241 See, e.g., United States Department of State, Consular Notification and 
Access, supra note 189 (serving as an example that knowledge among 
individual enforcement agencies is increasing and that the federal government, 
at least, is taking the provision seriously). 
242 This case centered on fifty-one Mexican nationals who were sentenced 
to the death penalty in Texas without being informed of the consular notification 
provision in Article 36. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008). 
Mexico brought a case on behalf of its nationals before the International Court 
of Justice which ruled against the United States and asked for ―review and 
reconsideration‖ of the convictions. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. 
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (March 31). The Supreme Court held that an ICJ 
ruling was not binding on the state courts. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367. 
243 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davidow, Protecting Them Protects Us; Why You 
Should Care About What Happens to 51 Mexican Nationals on Death Row, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A15; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments Over 
Whether Foreigners Have Reciprocal Rights in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2006, at A19. 
244 The State Department periodically sends notice to state governors and 
state attorneys general regarding the consular notification provision, as well as 
pocket-sized reference cards for distribution to law enforcement officers. 
Vadnais, supra note 215, at 333. See also discussion of State Department 
website and training efforts supra Part III.A. 
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commitment to enforcing Article 36.
245
 Procedural safeguards 
implemented by the DOJ (and similarly situated executive 
offices)
246
 further demonstrate the seriousness with which the 
federal government now takes the provision. While it may have 
been reasonable to assume that states could or would not comply 
because of ignorance or a failure to take the provision seriously ten 
years ago,
247
 recent cases and executive actions have forestalled 
such assumptions.
248
 
The second and third issues—difficulty in identifying foreign 
nationals, and unwillingness or inability to bear the burden of 
notifying foreign nationals
249—can be easily resolved. If Congress 
enacted a funding statute, the federal government—not individual 
states—would bear the cost of enforcing the provision, which 
should alleviate concerns that states will not comply because of the 
financial burden of enforcement.
250
 Furthermore, the State 
Department has offered materials to ease any administrative 
burdens, both in providing a ready-made program for 
implementation so no resources need to be expended on 
developing procedures
251
 and in creating materials that make 
implementation easy for officers on a day-to-day basis.
252
 
Therefore, the proposed method, in which Congress enacts a 
funding statute, in combination with the current practices of the 
federal government, would eliminate the traditional excuses 
against state implementation of the VCCR. 
  
                                                        
 245 Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International 
Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 434, 444 (2004) (discussing the 
ICJ‘s commendation of the increased State Department efforts as a ―good faith 
effort‖ to comply with the VCCR).  
246 See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text. 
247 See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (first 
Supreme Court Article 36 case).  
248 See supra notes 242–46 and accompanying text. 
249 See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 332–33. 
 250 See supra note 224–25 and accompanying text. 
251 United States Department of State, Download a Model CNA Standard 
Operating Procedure, supra note 204. 
252 See discussion of State Department training material, supra Part III.A. 
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 Not only are the states capable of implementing the VCCR, 
there is merit in allowing states to do so.
253
 Aside from the 
importance of preserving state sovereignty, allowing states to 
spearhead implementation on their own can lead to greater, more 
effective execution of such rights by permitting experimentation 
with different procedures and approaches.
254
 Some methods may 
prove more effective or more efficient than others; those methods 
can in turn be adopted by other jurisdictions.
255
 Also, some 
procedures may be well-suited for states with large populations of 
foreign nationals, but not for those with smaller concentrations of 
foreign nationals.
256
 Allowing flexibility in implementation will 
allow the most effective and efficient means of compliance within 
each jurisdiction. In fact, this would be consistent with the spirit of 
the provision, which recognizes that different methods may be 
more or less effective in different legal systems, and thus 
purposefully leaves implementation to each nation.
257
 In sum, the 
choice of specific procedures to implement the requirements of 
Article 36 should be left to the states because they can more 
effectively and efficiently enforce compliance than the federal 
government. The federal government should merely supplement 
states‘ efforts to ease the administrative and financial burdens 
states face in complying with an international treaty obligation. 
                                                        
 253 See Patchel, supra note 235, at 11 (discussing the advantages of 
conditional spending as the implementation of treaty obligations where states 
retain primary control). 
 254 See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 
911 (2008) (―Diversity produces many good ends such as . . . chances to 
experiment with different solutions to similar problems . . . .‖). 
 255 See id. (―Diversity produces many good ends such as . . . competitive 
pressures on local governments to adopt the most appealing of these 
solutions.‖). 
 256 The distribution of foreign nationals is uneven with California, New 
York, Texas and Florida harboring a majority of all foreign nationals in the U.S. 
See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Mapping Immigration: Legal 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/data/ 
lprmaps.shtm (follow ―Total LPR Flow by State‖ ―2000-2003‖ and ―1990-1999‖ 
hyperlinks) (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (graphs showing total legal permanent 
resident flow by state).  
 257 See generally VCCR, supra note 1. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no denying the importance of Article 36 of the VCCR. 
As Jeffrey Davidow, former U.S. statesman,
258
 put it, ―[n]o citizen 
is in more need of consular support than the one who faces the 
terrifying ordeal of arrest and imprisonment under a foreign legal 
system.‖259 The consular notification provision gives at least some 
assurance to travelers that if necessary, they have at least one ally 
in their country throughout such an ordeal. Enforcing compliance 
with the provision domestically strengthens U.S. use of the 
provision when its own citizens are in trouble abroad.
260
 However, 
to assume that judicial remedies are the best and only option 
available to give effect to the provision ignores both the 
construction of the treaty and the alternative forms of compliance. 
First, by way of modern treaty interpretation as employed by 
U.S. courts, the VCCR does not confer any individually 
enforceable rights on foreign nationals.
261
 Second, the VCCR 
provides no specific judicial remedies, and no domestic judicial 
remedies are well-suited to address the consular notification 
provision—even if the treaty is read to encompass individual 
rights.
262
 Finally, the federal government has already taken 
effective steps to ensure compliance within federal law 
enforcement agencies.
263
 States have not yet uniformly adopted 
any such steps;
264
 however, given a ―funding statute‖ and guidance 
from the State Department, states are capable of ensuring 
compliance on their own. This method of compliance that works 
with, rather than competes with, federalism is both an effective and 
                                                        
258 Jeffrey Davidow served as ―U.S. ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela and 
Mexico in the Reagan, Clinton, and both Bush administrations.‖ Davidow, supra 
note 243. 
259 Id. 
 260 See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., 
concurring) (discussing the increased likelihood that U.S. citizens abroad will be 
denied access to their consulate if the U.S. fails to comply with the VCCR).  
 261 See supra Part II.A. 
 262 See supra Part II.B. 
 263 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e). 
 264 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c; OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642. 
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efficient solution to the problem of consular notification 
compliance in the United States. 
